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The Iraq Abuse Allegations and the Limits of UK Law 
 
Andrew Williams* 
 
ABSTRACT.  Since 2003 there have been multiple legal processes focused on allegations of 
unlawful killing and ill-treatment of Iraqi civilians committed by UK armed forces. They have 
provoked political reaction, providing a focus for establishing constraints on legal actions 
for human rights abuses being brought against British forces in service overseas. This article 
interprets this history within the context of the efficacy and limits of law and judicial review 
as means for assessing the exercise of power, attributing responsibility for the unlawful acts 
of state agents, and holding the state and its officials accountable for systemic violations of 
human rights. It does so by outlining four discernible phases of legal response before 
considering their possible wider implications for UK law when faced by allegations of 
widespread human rights abuses.   
  
KEY WORDS: human rights, public law, Iraq allegations, judicial review, judicial deference, 
impunity 
 
 
Allegations of unlawful killing and systemic abuse of Iraqi civilians by the British army in 
Iraq between 2003 and 2009 have attracted persistent attention over the past fourteen years.1 
But amidst all the hyperbole of political and press representation of the affair, there has been 
remarkably little analysis of the efficacy and limits of public law as a means of holding the 
state and its officials accountable for its involvement in and response to alleged multiple and 
potentially systemic violations of fundamental human rights standards. This is surprising 
given the numerous public law issues that have arisen.  
In this article, I attempt to redress this relative absence so as to interrogate the 
relationship between law and politics in this particularly charged field of overseas military 
operations. In doing so, I also consider whether this may shine some light on the current state 
of public law in general: in other words, I ask to what extent the case of the Iraq allegations is 
reflective of a legal system ill-structured to achieve accountability for (systemic) human 
rights violations. 
To deal with these matters, I first review the history of fragmented government legal 
responses to the Iraq allegations since 2003. This can be divided into four distinct but 
overlapping phases. From initial preference for criminal justice processes and a general 
denial of jurisdiction to a convoluted investigative procedure overseen by a deferential court, 
I chart how the law has been deployed within a changing political environment. 
Second, I then question whether this history reflects inherent limitations of UK public 
law as a means of ensuring government accountability and official responsibility for human 
rights abuses at one of its margins, namely conduct of state agents engaged in overseas 
military action particularly vis-à-vis allegations of systemic violations. I examine four issues 
that lie at the heart of the relationship between law and politics in this respect and which, like 
the four phases mentioned above, are inter-related: jurisdiction, justiciability, judicial 
deference and the availability of effective remedies. In this context, I query whether 
accountability (if not responsibility) for alleged serious wrongs committed by the state has 
been stalled for want of politics and law. And I ask if there has been undue deference to the 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, University of Warwick. I am grateful for comments received at readings of an earlier 
version of this article at the Lauterpacht Institute for International Law, University of Cambridge.  
1 ‘The Iraq allegations’ is used for ease of reference. 
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executive and Parliament, allowing government to determine how allegations should be 
investigated or how proven wrongdoings might be remedied.  
Finally, whilst recognising the particularity of the Iraq allegations, I question whether 
this complicated affair casts doubt on the capacity of public law processes as a whole to 
resolve even substantiated claims of systemic violations of human rights levelled against 
British institutions of state. In other words, is this case reflective of principles, structures and 
processes of public law that enable politics to trump rights at every legal stage? If so, does it 
represent a general incapacity or weakness of law in the UK for the protection and 
enforcement of recognised human rights norms? 
 
 
The Phases of Legal Response 
 
The phases I outline are not exact categorisations: they intersect both in time and substance. 
Nonetheless, they assist in assessing the developing character of the legal responses to the 
Iraq allegations, in particular those regarding the systemic elements that have emerged.2 
Some reminder of the factual detail along the way is necessary.   
 
First Phase: Jurisdictional Denial 
 
Reports of unlawful killings and ill treatment by British Forces emerged soon after the 
invasion of Iraq turned into occupation in May 2003. Though partial governmental 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing was forthcoming in some cases, these were presented as 
isolated, atypical and exceptional. They were treated (in so far as they were treated at all) 
through normal individualised criminal law processes of military investigation (by the Royal 
Military Police or unit commanding officer) and, should it be necessary, army disciplinary 
procedures or prosecution (ultimately court martial). Embarking on that legal path meant 
political and media enquiry was constrained, having to leave scrutiny to standard military 
justice procedures.  
The initial allegations centred on the treatment of Iraqis detained on grounds of 
security.3 Installations such as Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca and military bases throughout 
Iraq were used by the US and UK as holding and interrogation centres.4 Stories of abuse there 
were first reported by Amnesty International, who alleged torture by US personnel at Abu 
Ghraib prison from July 2003.5 In 2004, the Wall Street Journal revealed a confidential report 
by the International Committee of the Red Cross criticising the methods of detention and 
interrogation as ‘serious violations of international humanitarian law’.6 Both American and 
British forces were censured. In May 2004, The Times recorded that the UK Ministry of 
Defence were aware of such allegations from as early as May 2003.7 
                                                          
2 Stan Cohen describes such practices as ‘spatial isolation’ in his typology of governmental denial of multiple 
human rights violations committed by state agents. See Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and 
Suffering (Polity; 2001).  
3 See Brian J. Bill, ‘Detention Operations in Iraq: A View from the Ground’ in The War in Iraq: A Legal 
Analysis (Raul A. Pedrozo (ed)) (2010) 86 International Law Studies. 
4 See Philip Gourevitch and Errol Morris, Standard Operating Procedure: A War Story (London: Picador, 2008) 
and Jack Fairweather, A War of Choice: The British in Iraq 2003-9 (London: Jonathan Cape, 2011) 
5 Amnesty International, Iraq: A Decade of Abuses March 2013 
file://wimple/User53/l/larea/Documents/Iraq%20War%20Crimes/Amnesty%20Iraq%20abuse%20report.pdf  
6 The Wall Street Journal 7 May 2004. 
7 The Times 10 May, 2004 4. 
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The death of Baha Mousa in British Army custody in Basra in September 2003 was 
one of the cases highlighted by the ICRC.8 Disquiet related not just to the killing but also to 
the sustained ill-treatment of detainees that reportedly bore resemblance to interrogation 
techniques amounting to torture, inhuman or cruel treatment that had been banned by the UK 
government in 1972 following their unlawful use in Northern Ireland. The MoD confirmed 
that the matter was in the hands of the Royal Military Police but denied that the European 
Convention on Human Rights (articles 2 and 3 particularly) imposed any specific 
investigative duties vis-à-vis operations in Iraq. 
This denial of human rights jurisdiction was maintained when, in March 2004, an 
application was brought before the High Court on behalf of Mousa’s family for a judicial 
review into the RMP investigation, claiming the Human Rights Act did apply and the UK had 
failed in its human rights duties to carry out a sufficiently timely and independent inquiry into 
his death in custody.9 Five other civilian deaths (involving alleged killings outside custody) 
were brought at the same time in Al Skeini, which became a test case to determine jurisdiction 
issues. Separate applications for judicial review were also registered for a number of other 
allegations soon after.10  
A small number of courts martial followed. Convictions, even for junior ranks, were 
rare reinforcing fears that the Army was incapable of properly and fully investigating and 
prosecuting its own.11 Concerns about what was known or sanctioned or tolerated by senior 
officers in the field and further up the command chain, particularly regarding the ill-treatment 
of suspected ‘looters,’ the handling of detainees and interrogation techniques, could not be 
(and were not) confronted in these occasional criminal proceedings. This provoked political 
and press criticism. The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament investigated the 
issue of detainee treatment in Iraq (as well as Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay) in 2005 
though not for army personnel in general only intelligence staff. It found that these operatives 
‘were not sufficiently trained in the Geneva Conventions’ and ‘were not aware of the 
interrogation techniques that the UK had specifically banned.’12 Disapproval reached a 
relative crescendo in 2006-7 when seven soldiers were court martialled in relation to the 
Mousa case, but only one (Corporal Donald Payne) was convicted, having already pleaded 
guilty to inhumane treatment.13 No one was found responsible for the killing.14 The case 
established, nonetheless, that abusive techniques had been regularly used by the Army unit 
concerned and may have been sanctioned higher up the command chain, a factor in the 
acquittal of some of the accused. 
Despite media unease, the government refused to open up any of the existing or 
emerging claims (including the Baha Mousa case) to independent and general legal scrutiny. 
                                                          
8 See n6 above and The Times 4 October 2003 4. 
9 Al Skeini v Secretary of State for Defence [2004] EWHC 2911 (Admin), [2007] QB 140 
10 For instance, Ahmed Jabber Kareem Ali, a 15 year old boy, suspected of looting, drowned in the Shat’ al-
Arab waterway after being forced into the water by British troops and left despite being in obvious difficulty 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4966046.stm); Nadhem Abdullah died of a fractured skull and brain haemorrhage 
after being stopped and searched and allegedly assaulted by soldiers of the Parachute Regiment 
(https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/sep/06/world.iraq); Iraqi ‘looters’ were photographed being abused in 
various disturbing (including sexual) ways at Camp Breadbasket in May 2003 (Guardian’s ‘special report’ at 
http://www.theguardian.com/Iraq/breadbasket/0,15804,1419469,00.html) 
11 In 2005, two junior soldiers were convicted for the Camp Breadbasket abuse, See 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/feb/24/iraq.military  
12 Intelligence and Security Committee, ‘The Handling of Detainees by UK Intelligence Personnel in 
Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and Iraq’, 1 March 2005, para 120, 31. 
13 The charge of manslaughter against Payne was dismissed. 
14 The Judge Advocate noted that many soldiers who gave evidence had ‘closed ranks’ making conviction 
impossible. The Guardian 26 January 2008.  
4 
 
It maintained its denial of HRA jurisdiction. Instead, it conducted an internal army review.15 
Brigadier Robert Aitken finally reported in 2008 that there had been several cases of 
‘deliberate abuse’ but these were the product of rogue soldiers not a systemic issue.16  
The Al Skeini litigation eventually reached the House of Lords in 2007, where it was 
held the HRA and the ECHR did not generally and automatically apply to the occupation. 
Where an Iraqi citizen was taken into custody, however, the substantive and procedural 
obligations of articles 2 and 3 ECHR were applicable on the grounds that the abuse had 
occurred within UK jurisdiction. Specifically, it was found that the investigation into the 
Mousa case was inadequate and the government’s responses not ECHR compliant.17 That 
was as much as the court could achieve. The government was placed under no judicial 
pressure to rectify or investigate any human rights failure other than in Mousa’s case. The 
other five claims in the litigation were denied on jurisdictional grounds and appeals to the 
European Court of Human Rights ensued.  
Another judicial review case was then launched, Al Jedda, involving a British citizen 
who alleged protracted unlawful detention in Iraq.18 Although the House of Lords accepted 
article 5 ECHR applied, given that the appellant was again within the UK’s jurisdiction, it 
also accepted that detention was lawful on the ground suggested by the government, namely 
that of security.  
 
Second Phase: Politically Constrained Public Inquiry  
 
The second phase of legal response developed as a product of the Al Skeini and Al Jedda 
decisions. Judicial review applications for similar fact allegations of ill-treatment within UK 
jurisdiction gradually increased. But even though issues of poor training, banned 
interrogation techniques and inadequate investigations had already been established, the 
government was placed under no legal pressure to look deeper at these or other systemic 
concerns.19 Whatever action was taken was a matter of political choice. In Baha Mousa’s case 
alone, the government acknowledged that there had been a failure of substantive and 
procedural obligations following the Al Skeini judgment. Consequently, in May 2008, five 
years after the killing, the Defence Secretary announced a limited judicial public inquiry 
under the Inquiries Act 2005.20 No mandate was given, however, to examine other cases, 
though the inquiry would consider how banned interrogation techniques had been adopted as 
part of the general detainee handling process.  
Another judicial review then attracted public attention. In the Al Sweady case, the 
claimant was the uncle of a man killed by British troops in the ‘Battle of Danny Boy’ in May 
2004.21 Various allegations were made, including that captured Iraqi fighters had been killed 
or ill-treated in British custody. Though the allegations were vehemently denied by the MoD, 
the judicial review claimed there had been insufficient investigation into the matter by the 
                                                          
15 Hansard, 25 Jan 2008 col 65WS Written Ministerial Statement by Des Browne Secretary of State for Defence. 
16 “The Aitken Report: An Investigation into Cases of Deliberate Abuse and Unlawful Killing in Iraq in 2003 
and 2004” Ministry of Defence, 25 January 2008. 
17 Al-Skeini and others (Respondents) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26 
18 R (on the application of Al-Jedda) (FC) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58 
19 The Armed Forces Act 2006 reshaped processes of military investigation and prosecution. It also introduced 
limits to the powers of commanding officers to deal with allegations of wrongdoing within unit disciplinary 
processes. 
20 Hansard col 60WS Secretary of State for Defence Written Parliamentary Statement on Mr Baha Mousa 14 
May 2008.  
21 Al-Sweady (and Others) v The Secretary of State for the Defence [2009] EWHC 2387 (Admin) 
5 
 
authorities.22 The Court condemned the MoD’s failure to disclose relevant documents and 
held that the investigation by the Army into the allegations was ‘not thorough or proficient’ 
and ordered that a proper enquiry be undertaken.23 The manner of that enquiry was again left 
in the hands of the government. In November 2009, the MoD chose to respond through 
another protracted public inquiry.24  
The holding of the Baha Mousa and Al Sweady inquiries did not change significantly 
the basic legal model evident in the first phase. Individual judicial review claims remained 
the only practicable route for legal examination of any alleged human rights violation. No 
other independent public institution was available to channel or consider patterns of actions 
that may or may not have pointed to systemic problems. The ad hoc inquiries ordered were 
restricted to their referred specific allegations, at least in terms of fault-finding, though the 
inquiry chairs were free to make general recommendations about ‘lessons to be learned’, 
potentially having a bearing on similar-fact cases and systemic issues.  
Although both inquiries considered army training and standard operating procedures 
regarding detainees, there was no coordination between them. Neither was empowered to 
consider any cases other than those before them, making impossible attributing responsibility 
for systemic issues that otherwise might have become apparent. In this respect, the 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing remained partial and the jurisdiction assumed determined 
strictly by the executive. This is by no means an unfamiliar critique of public inquiries in 
general.25  
The Baha Mousa Inquiry report, delivered in 2012, was nonetheless an indictment of 
those involved in the killing and the interrogation and handling techniques adopted by the 
army which were contributory factors in Mousa’s death. Hooding and ‘conditioning’, 
techniques to weaken the resistance of detainees prior to interrogation, were the same as used 
in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s and publicly banned in 1972 by the Conservative 
administration. The inquiry described this as a ‘lost doctrine’. But the chair, Sir William 
Gage, concluded that it was ‘unnecessary and inappropriate to blame or apportion blame to 
any individuals. It would also, in my opinion, be unfair to do so.’26 He reported that the MoD 
had ‘conceded that there were corporate failures’ which had arisen over ‘a lengthy period of 
time and involved a combination of failings and missed opportunities, some more serious 
than others.’27   
This was as far as the inquiry went in determining responsibility for an established 
and proven serious systemic failure, one which contributed to serious human rights violations 
of potentially numerous civilians before doctrine was reformed. It did not provoke any 
commitment to investigate further as to when and where the abusive practices were used in 
Iraq. Indeed, it provided a blanket defence to any government or military official involved in 
the use of such illegal practices – all could point to the ‘lost doctrine’ that Gage held was 
unattributable.28  
                                                          
22 See ‘Genesis of the Inquiry’ in the Al Sweady Report 2014 available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/al-sweady-inquiry-report  
23 Failure to hand over relevant papers was described as ‘lamentable’ by the Court. Evidence given by the senior 
RMP officer as the government’s witness to discuss disclosure, was called ‘unsatisfactory’ and ‘seriously 
flawed’. Al Sweady n21 above [8] and [58]. 
24 Hansard col 82WS Bob Ainsworth, Written Statement to the House of Commons 25 November 2009. 
25 See Mark Elliott and Robert Thomas, Public Law 2nd edition (OUP 2014) 662-665.  
26 Baha Mousa Inquiry Report Vol II para 5.151 available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-
baha-mousa-public-inquiry-report  
27 ibid. 
28 Johnny Mercer MP posited just such a defence in the Defence sub-committee report ‘Who Guards the 
Guardians?’ 10 February 2017 
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Only when the ECtHR delivered its judgment in Al Skeini and Al Jedda in 2012, 
holding that the ECHR should apply to British Iraq operations in its exercise of ‘some of the 
public powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government’, that the obligation for 
the UK to undertake full and proper inquiries into all alleged killings and ill-treatment by the 
armed forces, was finally resolved.29 The decisions extended jurisdiction and opened the way 
for allegations to be addressed regardless of whether or not occurring in custody. The UK 
was obliged to conduct independent investigations, bringing prosecutions where the evidence 
merited it, involving the victims or their families, informing the public of what had happened 
and examining any evidence that pointed to systemic wrongs. It was nonetheless for the 
government to decide how to remedy these breaches both individually and systemically. The 
choice made introduced a third phase of legal response. 
 
Third Phase: Return to Criminal Justice Model  
 
Multiple judicial review applications made before and after the Baha Mousa Inquiry findings 
(and rendered superficially credible by its results, particularly the finding that various ill-
treatment methods were the result partly of a corporate failure), together with the ECtHR’s 
judgments, required a government reaction. But rather than open up potential systemic abuses 
to general public scrutiny, a return to an exclusive criminal justice model was pursued.  
In March 2010, the MoD established the Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT) to 
investigate the mounting claims and fulfil the procedural requirements of the ECHR.30 The 
alternative of an over-arching public inquiry was specifically denied, though not ruled out 
entirely ‘should serious and systemic issues emerge from IHAT's investigations that might 
justify it’.31 As the number of allegations (particularly of ill-treatment in detention) then 
continued to increase, the lawyers acting for the majority of complainants brought a judicial 
review in Ali Zaki Mousa (2) arguing that only an over-arching public inquiry could fulfil the 
state’s duties to uncover the truth of any systemic wrongdoing.32  
The Court accepted that the UK was not fulfilling its Article 2 investigative 
obligations, pointing to the absence of any convictions and a lack of expertise, focus and 
direction.33 IHAT was criticised for ‘recurring slippage’ in its investigations,34 the processes 
adopted being inaccessible for the public ‘on the broader issues of State responsibility,’35 the 
families of the deceased having not been sufficiently (or at all) involved,36 and the MoD’s 
steps ‘to deal with wider and systemic issues’ not being ‘public or subject to independent 
scrutiny’.37  
                                                          
29 Al Skeini and others v. UK (2012) 53 EHRR 18 [149]. The limits of jurisdiction remain in dispute: see the 
Court of Appeal ruling in Al-Saadoon and Others v Secretary of State for Defence and Others [2016] EWCA 
Civ 811. Nonetheless, by November 2015 the MoD’s had paid out £19.6m settling 323 claims for unspecified 
human rights violations 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/476727/20151109-FOI2015-
06481-RESPONSE-O.pdf 
30 Hansard col 93WS 1 Mar 2010 Written Ministerial Statements House of Commons 
31 Hansard col 27WS 1 Nov 2010 Written Ministerial Statements House of Commons. A successful judicial 
review found that IHAT was insufficiently independent given that the RMP, who provided the personnel for 
investigations, were too intimately connected with the serving forces in Iraq. The Royal Naval Police replaced 
them: see R (Ali Zaki Mousa) v Secretary of State for Defence (No 1) [2011] EWCA Civ 1334. 
32 Ali Zaki Mousa & others -v- Secretary of State for Defence (No. 2) [2013] EWHC 1412 (Admin) 
33 ibid [184]. 
34 ibid [187]. 
35 ibid [188]. 
36 ibid [190]. 
37 ibid [194]. 
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Despite these failings, the Court refused to ‘impugn’ the Secretary of State’s decision 
not to order an inquiry on the basis that it would be ‘extremely lengthy and open-ended’ and 
too costly.38 It noted, unfavourably, the delays of other unrelated inquiries, inferring that the 
perceived failures of these procedures made the Iraq claims (which appeared more 
widespread, complex and occurring over several years) even less likely to succeed.39 The 
Court thus left IHAT to continue its case-by-case criminal inquiries but recommended a 
coronial process for each of the individual ‘death cases’ (as they were inelegantly called) that 
had already been dismissed in previous courts martial but were now damned as suffering 
from inadequate investigation. Article 3 allegations (deemed less important) were reserved 
for IHAT to pursue at its discretion.  
After that decision in 2013, IHAT continued to undertake enquiries with a designated 
judge reviewing progress and deciding individual questions of jurisdiction. The caseload 
quickly reached over 1,500 matters.40 However, no prosecutions followed. Even in Baha 
Mousa’s case, where IHAT announced in September 2013 that it was pursuing ‘new lines of 
inquiry’ following the Baha Mousa Inquiry report, nothing has been heard since.  
Aware of its responsibilities to consider systemic matters, the MoD nevertheless 
established an internal Systemic Issues Working Group (SIWG) ‘identifying, reviewing, and 
correcting areas where doctrine, policy and training have been insufficient to prevent 
practices or individual conduct that breach its obligations under international humanitarian 
law.’41 It has no mandate to identify persons responsible for any systemic issues it might 
uncover. Accountability is limited to noting ‘gaps in doctrine, policy and training’ and 
checking whether those gaps have been filled. Its function is restricted to fulfil the ‘lessons 
learned’ component of the Convention procedural duties.42 It explicitly excludes examining 
‘intentional breaches’ of doctrine, which are deemed not to be systemic issues.43  
The Iraq Fatalities Investigations (IFI) was then instituted in 2013 in order to fulfil the 
coronial duties demanded in Ali Zaki Mousa (2). Sir George Newman was appointed as chair 
with the remit that he must not ‘consider issues of individual or collective culpability, and no 
prosecutions will result from his examination of these cases.’44 Several killings have been 
referred and reported on to date with variable outcomes.45 Only one, the killing of Kareem 
Ali, a 15 year old boy arrested in May 2003 by members of the Irish Guards on suspicion of 
looting, might lead to consideration of a systemic matter. Newman decided that abusive 
processes of dealing with suspected looters in Basra was seriously questionable and 
announced he would examine the broader issue to determine whether the practices were a 
                                                          
38 ibid [4] 
39 Reasoning for refusing an inquiry was set out at ibid [198-211].  
40 IHAT Quarterly Report June 2016 available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/545281/20160725-IHAT-
Quarterly_Update_website_Jun16.pdf  
41 See MoD, ‘Systemic Issues identified from Investigations into Military Operations Overseas, July 2014’ at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/327180/Systemic_Issues_identifi
ed_from_investigations_into_military_operations_overseas.pdf  
42 ibid, 3 
43 See SIWG Annual Report 2016 fn 1.  
44 See http://www.iraq-judicial-
investigations.org/linkedfiles/ahmed_ali/key_documents/letterofappointmentandtermsofreference(ahmedjabbark
areemali).pdf  
45 In Nadhem Abdullah’s case, use of excessive force was found to have led to his death. In Hassan Said death 
had resulted from soldiers acting in self-defence. See http://www.iraq-judicial-
investigations.org/linkedfiles/reports/consolidatedreportintothedeathsofnadheemabdullahandhassansaid.pdf The 
case of Muhammad Salim also found that the shooting was likely an act of self-defence. See http://www.iraq-
judicial-investigations.org/linkedfiles/reports/reportintothedeathofmuhammadsalim(accessible)part1.pdf at para 
6.40. 
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routine mode of punishment known and tacitly accepted by senior commanders. There is, 
however, still no means for collective culpability to be assessed through this process. 
 
Fourth Phase: Institutional Denial 
 
The government’s approach to the multiple allegations and the role of law arguably entered a 
fourth phase in 2014. General and principled denial of systemic wrongdoing was now 
accompanied by a demonization of those lawyers who had brought judicial review or civil 
compensation claims on behalf of Iraqis. Although only two law firms were involved (Public 
Interest Lawyers and Leigh Day & Co) the narrative of ‘left wing activist lawyers’ 
establishing an industry of false claims became entrenched. The full force of the criminal law 
was still promised in the (unlikely) event of allegations being proven to be true. But, 
ironically the established processes for uncovering that ‘truth,’ most notably IHAT, was 
simultaneously condemned politically and in the press for giving excessive credence to the 
claims made and pursuing investigations of ex-service people in reportedly intrusive ways.  
 The political position hardened when the Al Sweady Inquiry reported that although 
aspects of the army’s detention of Iraqi detainees concerned ‘amounted to actual or possible 
ill-treatment’, the most serious allegations of unlawful killing and torture were rejected as 
‘wholly and entirely without merit or justification.’46 It established that evidence given by a 
number of ‘Iraqi witnesses [was] unprincipled in the extreme’.  Michael Fallon announced 
regret that ‘instances of ill-treatment’47 had occurred but laid the blame for the ‘protracted 
nature and £31 million cost of this unnecessary public inquiry’ on the Iraqi detainees and the 
two legal firms who represented them (PIL and Leigh Day & Co.). Despite acknowledging 
that the inquiry resulted from the MoD’s disclosure failings in the earlier judicial review, 
Fallon accused the lawyers of failing to disclose a vital document which would have shown 
the detainees to be members of an insurgent force (not civilians) and which would have, in 
his opinion, led to the denial of legal aid received by the claimants. Fallon announced that 
both firms were to be referred to the SRA for their alleged misconduct. 
The charges of ethical breaches coupled with the Al Sweady findings allowed the 
government’s assumption that the Iraq allegations were generally spurious and the product of 
malice and greed to become the dominant narrative.48 When a number of the accusations of 
ethical breaches laid against Phil Shiner (principal of PIL) were either admitted or finally 
proven in 2017, he was struck off the roll of solicitors. Those claims brought by PIL were 
then treated as wholly discredited. The government said the allegations were largely lacking 
in hard evidence, were the product of enticement by local agents, and all with the intent to 
malign the British Army. IHAT was therefore to be closed down. Even the 300 cases settled 
by the government (details of which have never been revealed) were presented as arising 
from nothing more than unlawful detention. The limited space for public examination of 
individual and systemic wrongs (as envisaged by the court in Ali Zaki Mousa (2)) was thus 
further curtailed. When Leigh Day & Co. solicitors were acquitted of all charges laid against 
them before the Solicitor’s Disciplinary Tribunal, the government’s position did not change. 
Deflecting all outrage to the conduct of solicitors was entrenched. Whether or not this will 
preclude legal analysis of systemic wrongs in the future, as part of some criminal or judicial 
review proceedings, remains to be seen.  
                                                          
46 Al Sweady Report n22 above, paragraphs 5.196-5.198. 
47 See Hansard 17 Dec 2014 col 1407 
48 See MoD blog 13 January 2016: ‘This Government has consistently voiced concerns about the volume of 
sometimes spurious claims made against our service people and believes the legal firms involved have questions 
to answer over their role in the current situation.’ https://modmedia.blog.gov.uk/2016/01/13/ihat-what-it-is-and-
what-it-does/  
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The Limits of Law 
 
What does this four phase history tell us about the capacity of public law to confront 
allegations of systemic violations of human rights by state institutions in situations of 
overseas military action? What, if anything, does it also have to say about the current state of 
the relationship between law and politics? 
 These questions inevitably engage long-standing constitutional debates about the 
appropriateness of when and to what extent the judiciary should intervene in the exercise of 
power by the executive and the legislature. Matters of jurisdiction, justiciability, judicial 
deference and the availability of effective remedies all have relevance here. The Diceyan 
vision of parliamentary sovereignty, minimally constrained, may remain an underpinning 
feature of these debates, demonstrating a persistent preference for politics, but it is also 
common ground that there has developed over the past few decades a willingness for the 
judiciary to loosen those constraints in favour of the protection of human rights.49 The 
Human Rights Act made this significantly more possible and has focused minds since on the 
rightfulness of judicial intervention. Whether or not this has alone shifted the balance too far 
towards law and judicial activism, weakening the coherence of the rule of law as a ‘necessary 
but not sufficient condition’ for protecting ‘civic virtues’ such as freedom and justice, is 
debatable.50 This is an inevitable tension when the law is given the opportunity to judge 
politics within a state.  
But whatever the contemporary arguments regarding this relationship, it seems 
uncontroversial to claim that public law should provide for some independent oversight of the 
executive in a modern functioning democracy. Nor does it seem controversial to claim that 
this, in part, should involve a process whereby government is held to account whenever 
credible allegations of the most serious violations of human rights come to light. Whether 
that would accord with a rights-based approach to public law is perhaps beside the point.51 
Even if there may be strong arguments against judicial interference in the operational matters 
of the military or security services (on the grounds that they have to be unfettered in the 
interests of the protection of the nation) and even if complex social questions of fundamental 
values may be arguably better considered by political rather than judicial means, the presence 
of credible allegations of systemic rights violations would for most be an exception allowing 
judicial and/or public scrutiny. Specifically that would accord with the recognised procedural 
requirement for independent review in the matter of examining state responsibility for 
breaches of articles 2 and 3 ECHR.52 Even where there is doubt over the veracity of some of 
the substantive claims, the principle of taking their investigation seriously by according with 
such procedural human rights norms is firmly established in law.   
The question then is the degree to which responses to the Iraq allegations are 
reflective of what Conor Gearty describes as ‘judicial restraint’ on the one hand and/or 
‘judicial deference’ on the other. The former relates to the judiciary’s autonomous 
determination that a matter lies outside the ‘competence of the judicial branch to 
adjudicate’.53 The latter, a recognition that even where competence is not in issue, the courts 
should defer to Parliament and the executive on the basis that those institutions are best 
placed to decide how to respond to any particular contentious issue. Both of these responses 
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have been prominent across the four phases I outlined in the previous section. They have 
manifested themselves through contestation over both jurisdiction and justiciability ever since 
the Al Skeini litigation began. For the former, there is little doubt that the government’s 
position was that human rights had no relevance to the Iraq invasion or occupation. It was the 
common political and governmental legal position that UK law had very little purchase in 
overseas military operations. If there was any doubt about the domestic position, CND v 
Prime Minister established in 2002 that the courts had no jurisdiction over the decision to go 
to war and lacked the competence to intervene in such a matter.54 If any alleged wrongdoing 
by state agents in the conduct of hostilities occurred, this would be the preserve of individual 
criminal processes governed by military law. The only recognised caveat to that was (and 
remains) contained in the International Criminal Court Act 2002, which gives the Attorney 
General power to authorise criminal proceedings against any military or command personnel 
for committing one of the three acknowledged international crimes (war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity). But there was no governmental acceptance that human rights 
norms (those contained within the ECHR) and by extension public law had any role to play. 
The decision whether to investigate or institute prosecutions for either individual criminal 
proceedings or suspected (though continuously denied) systemic wrongdoing remained 
wholly the preserve of the established military legal process.  
 The Courts have been generally compliant with this jurisdictional approach. However, 
this has sat uneasily within the developing human rights respecting culture of public law. The 
assumption that there are ‘no category of decisions a priori beyond the scope of review’ 
(though the standard may vary depending on circumstances), as Paul Daly suggests, and that 
there should therefore be no ‘no-go areas’ for the application of legal scrutiny of executive 
action on human rights related grounds, has become an established doctrine providing a 
strong counterweight to denials of jurisdiction.55 Of course, that does not mean, and has not 
meant, the judiciary is prepared to interrogate any and all executive decisions. In R(Gentle) v 
Prime Minister the House of Lords recognised the need for restraint in intervening in ‘matters 
of high policy’ (the decision to go to war) without ruling out intervention altogether.56 
Nonetheless, merely determining whether a matter is within the competence of the courts and 
thus justiciable provides a moment for reflection as to whether any particular matter is 
appropriate for judicial scrutiny. Though this ‘moment’ might encourage judicial wariness as 
regards intruding on political questions, the court’s competence in examining human rights 
standards is taken as read. Indeed, Daley suggests the dangers for the judiciary in avoiding 
‘the “moral cost” of the law’ failing to subject ‘possibly illegal state actions to judicial 
scrutiny’ has proven to be a strong incentive to examine allegations of human rights abuse 
even in traditionally non-justiciable areas.57 So, in Abbasi, the court showed its willingness to 
adjudge any government decisions where human rights were in issue.58 The Court of Appeal 
in Al Rawi also recognised the capacity as well as importance of doing so, stating that the 
‘force which seeks to press the courts into this area [foreign affairs], and within it to exercise 
a robust independent judgment, is the legal and ethical muscle of human rights’.59   
The court certainly found little difficulty in establishing in Al Skeini that allegations of 
breaches of substantive and procedural aspects of the right to life and right not to be subjected 
to torture and ill-treatment occurring within the confines of UK territory (deemed to include 
UK military bases or vehicles), fell within its jurisdiction and were justiciable. However, the 
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effect was twofold: it reinforced the exceptional nature of this intervention (restricting 
jurisdiction to very limited situations); and it maintained the individualised nature of its 
review. In other words, the court would only consider matters of principle in the light of the 
specific circumstances of an individual victim. The ECtHR’s Al Skeini ruling may have 
expanded the notion of extraterritorial jurisdiction of the ECHR to any geographic location 
under the command and control of a signatory state, but this did not alter the exceptional and 
individualised character of legal involvement.  
Even so, the ECtHR’s intervention and the various actions brought against the MoD 
over the last dozen years (including on behalf and for the benefit of army personnel as well as 
Iraqi civilians) has caused some to argue an unwelcome juridification of the armed forces 
through this human rights channel has developed. A new ‘legal context’ is said to exist, one 
which favours a putative rights-based approach of public law over traditional military 
autonomy which was previously absent of judicial scrutiny or critique.60 (In Smith v MoD, for 
instance, the Supreme Court held that service personnel carried the protection of UK human 
rights law wherever they served.)61 This has in turn provoked a political desire to amend the 
law to restrict application of human rights standards in relation to the conduct of the military 
overseas. Much political opposition to ‘lawfare,’ as it is derisively called, is premised on the 
deemed unwelcome intrusion into the military’s capacity to undertake operations, hampering 
the fulfilment of its duties. Some academics agree. Richard Ekins and Guglielmo Verdirame, 
for instance, focus on the perceived mistake of the ECtHR in Al Skeini extending the ECHR’s 
extra-territorial application to military interventions wherever they may take place.62 Ekins 
has also given evidence before the Parliamentary Defence sub-committee decrying the 
intrusion of law in this area.63 
The government has subsequently proposed a variety of legislative measures designed 
to restrict even further judicial scrutiny of allegations of human rights violations regarding 
the military. Foremost is the introduction of combat immunity from human rights grounded 
examination.64 A no fault system has been proposed whereby compensation would be paid 
for harm suffered by service personnel regardless of government negligence. The measure 
has been described as freeing the Armed Forces ‘from increasing judicial constraints whilst 
on operations’.65 Though ostensibly only applicable to members of the armed forces suing the 
MoD following injury or death (avoiding costly litigation by British troops or their families), 
the principle of taking military operations out of the court’s jurisdiction has been criticised by 
the Law Society, amongst others, on the basis that it would remove any possibility of 
objective review of policy or practice, potentially allowing government to avoid public 
scrutiny even in the systemic ill-treatment of its own personnel.66  
The Defence Secretary also announced in October 2016 that the Government would 
derogate from the ECHR (under article 15) ‘before embarking on significant future military 
operations’. It has, however, already been pointed out that such derogation cannot include 
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articles 2 and 3 ECHR, nor is it possible to avoid application of UK criminal law which 
applies to serving personnel wherever they operate under the Armed Forces Act 2006.67 
Even without these political developments and proposals, anxiety over jurisdiction 
and justiciability in relation to military operations overseas remains a feature of legal 
consideration of the allegations. Though significant overturn of the doctrine that human rights 
issues should be the subject of judicial scrutiny is unlikely to emanate from the courts where 
an individual has suffered violation, the Iraq cases have seen a judiciary generally uncertain 
about examining the possibility of systemic abuse.68 This has been accentuated by the nature 
of judicial review and public law in general which, as I have already intimated, places the 
individual at the core of its practice. Access to legal scrutiny is made contingent on criminal 
proceedings (investigations as well as prosecutions) being exhausted and the alleged victims 
obtaining the resources to bring an action if such proceedings are unsuccessful or delayed 
unreasonably. There may be good reasons for this contingency: preference for the rights of 
the individual is deeply set in common law and in thicker conceptions of the rule of law as 
well as western notions of human rights. And if judicial review is to be more of ‘a precision 
instrument’, as Tom Bingham argued, then its deployment has to be restricted in the interests 
of good administration.69 But the Iraq cases suggest that this practical structure is not well 
suited to address systemic problems, assuming that this is an important legal concern in the 
first place. It becomes a matter of luck whether any individual case (or cases) is able to be 
heard, provokes sufficient public outcry to place pressure on government to respond, and thus 
starts some process for uncovering any systemic issues. 
The four phases described in the previous section may imply some success in this 
respect, but the priority shown for the criminal process (IHAT is the latest example of its 
trumping effect) and the tortuous and flawed procedure by which individual claims have been 
brought by private lawyers, raises the question whether this is an efficient approach that can 
command public and political confidence that systems of abuse will be fully exposed. Even if 
the particular procedural requirements of articles 2 and 3 ECHR have been reaffirmed as 
requiring ‘lessons to be learned’ and those responsible to be held accountable, the procedures 
of judicial review do not easily look beyond the individual to the broader and deeper picture. 
Though the Iraq cases heard to date have led to some judicial criticism of government and 
military practice (particularly in the investigation of individual allegations), the possibility for 
considering effectively who might be responsible for systemic human rights concerns has 
been absent. Even in the potentially less restricted environment of the public inquiry, Sir 
William Gage’s unwillingness to identify those responsible for allowing banned interrogation 
techniques to become part of the system is indicative of this tendency. But it is also perhaps 
more indicative of the law’s structural inability to transcend the individual to examine the 
collective problem in the first place.  
Some will undoubtedly argue that this is how it should be. Those veering towards 
restricted interference in the operations of government, particularly in matters of security and 
military action, oppose anything other than a very light touch. Even with a more liberal view 
of the role of law and an expressed prioritisation of fundamental human rights, the Iraq 
example questions whether John Griffith’s condemnation of the judiciary’s ‘political 
position, which is primarily concerned to protect and conserve certain values and institutions’ 
continues to hold true.70 Undoubtedly, the role of the judiciary in its rights-based review of 
government actions has developed extensively since Griffith first made this observation, 
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particularly following the introduction of the HRA. The story of asylum litigation was one 
area charted by Richard Rawlins in 2005 suggesting the law’s limitations had been reduced.71 
He pointed to the ‘[o]fficial policy and practice’ of the asylum system which had ‘thrown up 
a ready supply of targets’ that campaigning litigation could exploit to challenge the system on 
rights grounds. Rawlins described this as part of a ‘developing practice in the UK of legal 
politics fuelled by the intense lobbying and networking activities of interest groups.’72  
Though this may be true, in the case of the Iraq allegations, with an absence of such 
lobbying, (political or otherwise) and indeed a seeming absence of political concern, ‘legal 
politics’ remains limited, if it exists at all. Indeed, they suggest severe limits to the potential 
of law as a means of uncovering systemic human rights matters when there is little or no 
political movement to channel concern in Parliament or the media. The individual test case 
approach allowed as an exception in the law to the general rule that government has the 
power to act as it decides, may provide some counterweight. But even when the court 
intervenes (as it has in various Iraq cases) it has no power to prompt wider investigation or 
inquiry to examine patterns or policies of abuse. There is no independent body in the UK 
which can intercede effectively to make that decision and no court has the power to order 
such a process. The most that appears to be possible is an application for review on a case-by-
case basis, hoping that with the weight of individual judicial decisions politicians will be 
encouraged to undertake some investigation. Whether a systemic issue attracts sufficient 
public opprobrium to lead to political action to investigate and obtain accountability (leaving 
aside any responsibility) remains contingent. Law in this respect is thus subservient to 
political power and does not offer an external forum for that form of accountability to operate 
unless or until an agency of criminal justice (the civilian or military authorities) assumes 
responsibility for investigation. Indeed, the judgment in Ali Zaki Mousa (2) also suggests that 
the larger the scale of abuse, the less the courts may be prepared to intervene substantially, 
fearing the political impact of their actions and the resultant economic costs. The argument 
that an independent inquiry was too expensive in those proceedings was accepted as a trump 
over rights rather than the other way around. 
This takes us into the territory of ‘judicial deference’. In the Iraq cases systemic 
human rights violations have been easily interpreted by the judiciary as a political rather than 
legal matter. Even in terms of individual abuses, Lord Hope in R v DPP expressed the need 
for the judiciary to ‘defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of the elected 
body or person whose act or decision is said to be incompatible with the Convention’.73 
Others have emphasised the exercise of this deference in human rights matters to allow 
Parliament to debate if, how and when rights apply in differing circumstances. There is 
general recognition that the courts should not be the determining body for all these questions. 
Though there is no fixed criteria for exercising deference, the assumption is that the executive 
and the legislature (and public bodies more widely) possess ‘superior expertise, competence 
or democratic legitimacy’.74 An evaluation of the circumstances in any particular case allows 
deference to then be a matter of practice rather than theory. Bingham J.’s dictum in Smith v 
Ministry of Defence that ‘the more substantial the interference with human rights, the more 
the court will require by way of justification before it is satisfied that the decision is 
reasonable’ remains an important if vague guide.75 But some have observed that adjudicating 
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human rights has been rendered futile by excessive deference in practice.76 TRS Allan has 
also condemned the tendency of judicial capitulation informed by a fear of political 
criticism.77  
The recent decision of Keyu may be an example of this judicial failing.78 There a 
challenge against the government decision not to order a public inquiry into the killing of 23 
unarmed civilians by British troops in Malaysia in 1948 was denied. Though the court could 
overrule or quash the exercise of discretion, it could only do so in accordance with 
Wednesbury rules.79 Being highly restrictive these well-established grounds are difficult to 
satisfy. Lord Kerr recognised this case was ‘an instance where the law has proved itself 
unable to respond positively to the demand that there be redress for the historical wrong that 
the appellants so passionately believe has been perpetrated.’80 But is the law predisposed 
against a positive response in the context of systemic human rights abuses? Is the balance 
heavily weighted in favour of the political decision even if the matter relates to possible 
governmental responsibility for committing those abuses or failing to prevent or provide 
redress for their committal? 
The four phases suggest that though legal decisions have intermittently recognised the 
need for independent and impartial investigations into allegations of human rights abuse, the 
courts have appeared unable or unwilling to encourage a solution that would fulfil the 
acknowledged procedural obligation. The space then is opened for government manoeuvre to 
ensure that systemic issues, which by their nature potentially implicate the executive through 
the actions or inaction of government departments and personnel, go unscrutinised. So, for 
instance, following the Al Skeini ECtHR judgment, the establishment of the Systemic Issues 
Working Group within the MoD was presented as its means of achieving compliance. But 
that group’s efforts have remained out of public gaze save for the publication of annual 
reports. The quality of these is reflected in the first published in 2014, which identified 
nineteen ‘distinct issues’ of concern, but stressed that these related to the ‘potential’ for these 
‘issues to occur’ and did not ‘necessarily mean that these failings actually occurred in every 
case’.81 The ‘issues’ represented a range of abusive practices against detainees: improper use 
of blindfolds, hooding, restriction of food and water, threats of or actual physical abuse, and 
sleep deprivation. For each issue, the SIWG noted where changes in policy, operation 
procedures or monitoring processes had been introduced by the Armed Forces to address 
perceived deficiencies. No review or comment was made in this or the subsequent reports on 
whether actual breaches had been uncovered. There is no indication that any investigation 
had taken place into the responsibility of those in command positions for any abusive systems 
adopted despite the tacit admission of unlawful systems or practices operating. 
These efforts could have been fully inspected by the courts, but Ali Zaki Mousa (No.2) 
still stands as the framing judgment in this respect. Judicial deference operated there so as to 
accept issues of cost and time and value for money as justifications for avoiding close review 
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of the state’s obligations to investigate allegations of human rights violations of the most 
serious kind. Despite acknowledging that the investigative duty should ‘identify the culpable 
and discreditable conduct of those involved, including their acts, omissions as well as 
identifying the steps needed for the rectification of dangerous practices and procedures’ the 
judgment provided for no effective means by which responsibility for systemic failings could 
be attributed.82 The court acknowledged that ‘[i]f, as there is some evidence to suggest, there 
was a lack of training and a failure to investigate early misconduct promptly, the question 
arises as to whether any responsibility for that arises in the higher ranks of the armed forces 
and in Government.’83 But the judgment failed to identify how that responsibility might be 
assessed through a process of law in the absence of direct evidence against an individual 
officer or official. The matter was instead left to government and to Parliament. According to 
Mr Justice Silber there was ‘no reason why a Parliamentary Committee cannot scrutinise the 
wider or systemic issues and the recommendations made; whether it does so or how it does so 
must be a matter for Parliament, whether it be through the Select Committee on Defence or 
another Committee or Parliamentary Commission.’84  
This discretion has not, however, been exercised. Beyond the SIWG (an internal MoD 
affair in any event), the Intelligence and Security Parliamentary Committee has purportedly 
been inquiring into detainee treatment as a theme since 2013. But claims of extraordinary 
rendition and the UK’s implication in other countries’ abusive practises has been its focus. Its 
concern is restricted to ‘the role of the UK Government and the intelligence and security 
Agencies in relation to detainee treatment and rendition, and not the Armed Forces’.85  
Similarly, the Defence Sub-Committee has ignored the issue, instead examining 
threats to the military and its personnel by multiple human rights challenges. In 2017 it 
criticised IHAT, stating its ‘focus has been on satisfying perceived international obligations 
and outside bodies, with far too little regard for those who have fought under the UK’s 
flag.’86 It acknowledged that banned abusive interrogation techniques had been practiced in 
Iraq, but blame was attributed to the MoD not forces personnel for this failure. The 
committee’s conclusion was that as ‘training material for interrogations contained 
information which could have placed service personnel outside of domestic or international 
law represents a failing of the highest order’ those who followed such ‘flawed guidance’ 
should be supported by the MoD if not protected from prosecution.87 There was no 
commensurate call for public examination of how and when that training came to be adopted 
and the unlawful practices implemented.  
What happens, then, when Parliament chooses not to examine such human rights 
matters? Is this a fulfilment of the democratic imperative? Superficially it would seem so, 
even if the parliamentary response is to avoid further scrutiny. But how can law be viewed on 
such occasions? Is it entirely a matter of trust in politics that systemic problems, even those 
where members of Parliament may be implicated (for instance with regard to the on-going 
child abuse inquiry) should remain principally outside the practice of law? One possible 
reading is that if the judiciary is engaged in assuaging the ‘moral cost’ of turning a blind eye 
to the state’s human rights failings, then it only does so at a superficial level, passing on legal 
responsibility to engage seriously on systemic matters under the guise of deference. This can 
only reinforce the argument that the law is less independent, and more a creature, of politics.  
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All four phases of public law response to alleged systemic abuse in Iraq show there 
may have been entry level scrutiny, as it might be called, in determining matters of 
jurisdiction or justiciability. Yet this has been followed by a reluctance or perceived inability 
to pursue a deeper, legally enforceable and overseen examination, with all that that might 
imply with regard to lack of accountability and individual responsibility. Whether this 
suggests a challenge to the rule of law at a fundamental level or a reinforcement of Tom 
Bingham’s assertion that the judiciary are ‘auditors of legality: no more, no less’ is an open 
question.88 But in Ali Zaki Mousa (2), as I have indicated, deference regarding systemic 
issues has been informed by economic cost arguments rather than issues of expertise, 
competence or democratic legitimacy. Where cost enters the frame at the point of 
adjudication, and where government not the court determines such cost is too heavy, then the 
practice of deference appears as an in-built resistance to judicial scrutiny for any complex 
allegations of systemic wrongdoing by the state. 
What then can be made of the remedies that have been offered through law in relation 
to the Iraq allegations? Across the four phases, the public inquiry has become the pre-eminent 
goal for litigants. This is in the context of the inquiry being seen as a potential link between 
law and politics where alleged state failure can supposedly be examined by an independent 
body intent on getting to the truth. If successful, the supposition is that there will be a 
political cost and an attribution of responsibility. Indeed, with no other judicial remedy 
available to examine the details and hear victims of systemic wrongs, the public inquiry has 
developed into what Harlow and Rawlings have described as part of the ‘standard machinery 
of accountability’.89 The Iraq related proceedings have thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
frequently sought a declaration from the courts calling on government to order such a 
procedure.  
 However, even though a number of Iraq related inquiries have been provoked in this 
way (suggesting the value of law in achieving some accountability), the history of these 
procedures show their deficiency in addressing systemic human rights issues. Three aspects 
in particular are relevant for my general argument. 
First, the bar is set extremely high for any court to recommend, let alone instruct, the 
government to order any public inquiry. Judicial deference manifested itself here to the extent 
that in Ali Zaki Mousa (2) there was no desire to ‘impugn’ the decision of the Secretary of 
State to refuse an overarching inquiry into the hundreds of allegations. The court accepted the 
government’s contentions on excessive cost and time even though it made no reference to any 
cost/benefit analysis that might have justified the decision.90   
Second, even when a decision is made to hold an inquiry, the executive determine the 
terms upon which it operates. Though members of the executive may bear responsibility for 
alleged wrongdoing, political calculation dictates the character of these initiatives, allowing 
government, as Blom-Cooper observed some years ago, to ‘distract the critics or deflect 
criticism’.91 Given their likely prolonged nature, attention can also be diverted long enough 
for individual accountability to become unlikely if irrelevant for most involved. The history 
of public inquiries shows that this supposed remedy, accepted as satisfying the procedural 
requirements of articles 2 and 3 ECHR for instance, rarely succeeds in attributing 
responsibility speedily or at all. Though they may eventually make public the truth of an 
allegation, political control of their mandates and limited resources can reduce their value to 
one of historical interest rather than attainment of justice. When used in relation to an 
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individual case, such as the unlawful killing of Baha Mousa or the treatment of those 
participants in the Al Skeini inquiry, there may well have been a good resolution that served 
to prove or discount an allegation of violation, but neither were capable of addressing wider 
issues. That lay beyond their remit. The most that could be achieved was fulfilment of the 
‘lessons to be learned’ procedural requirement in cases of human rights failing. Though of 
clear value in itself, the inquiry model actively enhances rather than counters the state’s 
avoidance of the attribution of responsibility. 
Third, the inherent privileging of criminal justice processes (apparent in all phases) as 
applied to individual wrongdoers has been allowed to trump any public interest in obtaining 
accountability from state agents and the executive, again delaying full examination of 
systemic wrongs. That preconditioned legal environment, as the Iraq cases demonstrate, 
allows collective and command accountability (if not responsibility) to be held in prolonged 
abeyance pending resolution of direct perpetrator culpability. Systemic wrongs become 
credible only if multiple perpetrators are successfully prosecuted thus providing evidence of a 
systemic problem. So, in the Iraq cases, even the possibility of a public inquiry into systemic 
matters has been disallowed until the completion of criminal investigations and proceedings. 
Assurances have been given that responsibility for systemic wrongdoing will be assessed as 
IHAT investigations continue, but it would be absurd to see them as evident if no or few 
prosecutions arise. Individual criminal responsibility for systemic wrongs may still be 
triggered by independent processes of the police and the relevant prosecution agencies 
(though the approval of the Attorney General is required for a prosecution for crimes under 
the ICCA), but these bodies are ill-equipped to interpret and investigate allegations of 
systemic wrongs where the identity of those responsible is unclear or cultures of abuse have 
been formed. Equally, their work is of necessity out of the public gaze, leaving all putative 
wrongdoers subject to little political or legal sanction.  
Together, these three features of the public inquiry as currently constructed in the UK 
legal context, reinforce the sense of law’s limitations in the context of systemic state 
violations of fundamental rights.    
         
 
Conclusion 
 
To what extent, then, is this assessment of law particular to the issues of military operations 
(in Iraq) or indicative of a general inability to address systemic or institutionalised wrongs? It 
might be difficult to extrapolate from the case of Iraq given the peculiar relationship between 
politics, the public and the armed forces in the UK today. Examination of other situations of 
systemic wrongdoing by state agents and the histories of legal response would be necessary 
to fully answer the question.92 But at the very least, the Iraq example demonstrates how the 
current level of political control over the justice system, supported by judicial restraint and 
deference, can undermine any pretension that allegations of systemic serious human rights 
abuses will be uncovered effectively through law. In matters of principle (where jurisdiction 
can restrict consideration of wrongs), structure (where access to courts and independent 
review is also restricted by political determination) and practice (through the judicial 
preference for restraint and deference and limits to suitable remedies), the law has been 
constrained. Neither judicial review nor criminal justice processes, nor civil litigation for 
compensation, have been disposed towards uncovering whether institutionalised wrongdoing 
has developed. Despite acknowledged violations of human rights standards the truth of 
                                                          
92 The example of Northern Ireland and historical review of wrongdoing during the Troubles may be of 
particular importance here. 
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systemic wrongdoing has not been revealed through public law processes despite the multiple 
legal initiatives.  
This begs the consequent question whether law (adept at resolving individual 
allegations or not) should have the capacity to wrest the complexities of accountability for 
institutionalised rights violations from political control. If the conclusion to that is that it 
should then what alternatives to the current structures might be feasible? The experience of 
many societies undergoing transition from dictatorship or civil war to democracy may offer 
some guidance. These too have struggled with the problem of accountability and attribution 
of responsibility for the most serious institutional human rights breaches. Different methods 
have been promoted internationally from truth commissions to boards of inquiry and fact-
finding missions. Respect for the victims and the right to truth in general lie at the heart of 
such initiatives, as the UK Government has endorsed.93 Prosecutions may form part of that 
process but not to the exclusion of unearthing what has taken place and recording that 
information as a memorialisation of wrongdoing and its impact through some independent 
body. Though the complete absence of political control may be something of a fiction, 
impartiality is deemed central to getting to the truth. 
The UN Human Rights Commission has also recommended that all national 
permanent human rights bodies be mandated to consider systemic issues independently of 
political influence or direction.94 In the UK, the Equality and Human Rights Commission 
might be expected to fulfil this role. But to date it has only occasionally examined systemic 
issues (for instance in relation to older people in home care).95 Even when the EHRC was 
faced with persistent allegations of UK’s ‘acquiescence or complicity in torture’ abroad in 
2014, it could only recommend that ‘an independent, judge-led inquiry’ was necessary. Its 
advice was ignored in favour of review in secret by the Intelligence and Security Committee 
of Parliament to which the EHRC could only make representations.96 The Commission’s 
influence as a national human rights institution, and possible antidote to a putative deficiency 
in public law, has been further undermined by ‘restructuring’ with the effect that the EHRC’s 
budget will be cut from £62m in 2010 to £17.4m by 2020. That suggests that although it has 
the potential to enhance accountability for systemic human rights concerns, at present it is 
unlikely to have a role in any scrutiny whether in respect of military/security issues or 
otherwise.97 Nonetheless, enhancing rather than downgrading the EHRC could be a plausible 
response to the deficiencies of public law that I have outlined. Ironically that would take a 
political decision to bring about. 
In the meantime, the Iraq allegations saga may continue for some years even with the 
dismissal of most individual claims and the closing of IHAT.98 Some allegations may be 
false, though there has been extremely limited public exposure of these beyond the Al Sweady 
case. In the absence of a properly constructed human rights institution to carry out informed 
and over-arching review, any public law led accountability for systemic wrongdoing remains 
                                                          
93 See for instance the UKAid sponsored review by Haider, H. (2016). Transitional justice: Topic guide. 
Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham. Also see Ministry of Defence Manual of the Law of 
Armed Conflict (OUP 2005) which notes the value of ‘high-level formal inquiries into alleged violations’ at 
paragraph 16.1(c).  
94 OHCHR National Human Rights Institutions (2010). A permanent inquiries unit was advocated by Select 
Committee on the Inquiries Act 2005, The Inquiries Act 2005: post-legislative scrutiny (2014), at paras 165–177 
95 EHRC ‘Close to Home’ Inquiry (2011) 
96 EHRC submission at https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/file/4686/download?token=XBdlNTZv  
97 The problem of political support through allocation of resources has affected the Police Ombudsman for 
Northern Ireland, who has complained that investigations into killings during the Troubles could take decades 
following government cuts, see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-41321687  
98 IHAT discontinued multiple allegations on the grounds that ‘it was not proportionate to continue 
investigating.’ IHAT Quarterly Update January 2017. 
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a distant prospect. What precedent can the law then provide for other systemic wrongs that 
come to light and are found closer to home? The chaos of the Independent Inquiry into Child 
Sexual Abuse, which has been dogged by an extraordinary sequence of bizarre appointments 
and resignations, and the experience of historic wrongs in Northern Ireland, do not suggest 
that the current politically controlled and limited public law response to alleged systemic 
abuses will be effective when confronted by other large scale abuses. If nothing else, 
therefore, the Iraq allegations saga provides a warning that failure to map this inherent 
problem in law may further undermine the primary importance of respect for human rights 
and the rule of law as key principles of UK democracy. 
 
